Historical barriers to production in Iran

Historical barriers to production in Iran
  • 2020-09-13
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Saad Pira says that the foundations of Iran's economy were formed on the basis of brokerage culture due to the lack of specialized government officials as well as economic theorists during the Qajar period, and this was one of the barriers to production at that time.

According to the International Iranian Stone Exhibition, the economy is a political component and today there is no one to oppose this statement. After all, money controllers have power. The holders of power around the world are also generally the countries with the most financial transactions. Therefore, political structures cannot be left out when discussing economics. Since the Qajar period, especially after the Iranians became acquainted with the political structures of the modern state, efforts have been made to industrialize Iran and gain power over the "production" component in the country. Iran has not been able to achieve a scientific leap since then, so it has slowly fallen behind the caravan of civilization. Although from the Qajar period to the end of the Pahlavi process, the process of entering Iran was formed, but self-awareness did not occur.

Iran's economy during the Qajar period was based on the agricultural system and quasi-feudal. This was directly related to the political structure and power. However, after the formation of the modern government in Iran and the establishment of the Shura Council, the founders of production and the master of speech could not gain full knowledge about this structure and ask it to help improve the production situation. We talked to Saad Pira about the role of this structure and its relationship with the lack of development in the economy and production. Pi is one of the specialized researchers in the history of Qajar period.

Translation of the book "Iran-Britain War and the Separation of Herat: 1273 AH" by Barbara English, correction of the books "Paris Lovers with a Detailed Introduction to the History of Translation during the Qajar History" (in collaboration with Abbas Gholi Sadeghi), "Travelogue of Kerman and Baluchistan Firooz Mirza Firooz" (With Dr. Mansoureh Ittihadiyeh) and also "Correspondence and letters of Mirza Ali Asghar Khan Atabak Amin Al-Sultan with Muzaffaruddin Shah" (with Dr. Alireza Nikonnejad), "Nusrat Al-Dawlah: Collection of correspondence, documents and memoirs of Firooz Mirza Firooz" (with Dr. Mansour's office) Registration of the rulings of His Highness Prince Emad al-Saltanah in the Shaqaqi government and the three blocs "(with Bahman Bayani) and" Under the skin of the city: regular reports (secret police) Shiraz: a selection of documents of Abdolhossein Mirza Farmanfarma in the Persian government "(with Dr. Mansoureh Union and Saeed Rouhi) is one of the books published by Saad P.

In the field of discussion about the economy and structure of production in the Qajar period, we have to enter the field of study of social and political phenomena of that period. What was the structure and pyramid of power during the Qajar period and how did this structure relate to the economy to finance itself?

You see, first of all, it should be noted that the economic structure with its subdivisions of production, industry and trade needs a basic foundation called the political structure. A political structure is a policy-maker, a director and a liaison with other structures. In addition, this structure is an observer and controller. Therefore, when talking about the economic structure and production in the Qajar period, we must discuss it while talking about the political structure of that time, which is above all structures. If the political structure moves functionally and functionally, the economic structure will move in the right direction.

From the beginning of the Qajar dynasty to its end, layers of power and political structure remain intact. In this structure, the king is at the top of the pyramid of power, that is, in the first layer. In the second layer after the Shah, if he has elected a Chancellor, and this Chancellor will remain in power until he has been removed for royal reasons and orders or Homayoun's decrees, and is still elected as an official title of Chancellor, he will sit in the next position. In the third layer of power, we have a population or a large number of princes and power dependents, peddlers, employees, and so on. This layer was the cause of the government - at the macro level - from the period of Fath Ali Shah until the end of Qajar. The important question here is why the country was constantly struggling with budget shortages during the Qajar period? Because of this endless spectrum, some of whose descendants date back to the reign of Fath Ali Shah, they devoured most of the country's budget. Many booklets are now kept in the National Library, the contents of which are a description of the benefits of this wide range, which accounted for an important part of the national budget.

This was also an inherited cause, and if someone died, it would be passed on to his descendants. In other words, neither the recipient himself nor the descendants received the reward without doing anything?

Yes, it is true, and this spectrum formed the next layer of power. Most of this spectrum were not only influential, but also had a lot of political influence. Next in line were courtiers, ministers, and bureaucrats in the fourth tier of power. The next layer consisted of the rulers of the regions, states and provinces, their local governors and their agents, each of whom included a large class in each state. The sixth layer was in the power of tribal chiefs, tribes and nomads. This layer formed the military structure of Iran, including cavalry and infantry, and at the same time provided livestock and agriculture. In fact, in addition to the military structure, they also had part of the economic structure or, more precisely, its subset, that is, part of production. And we must not forget that from the beginning of Qajar to the end of this very long period, the tribes were also considered as infiltrators, shareholders in governments, allies and supporters of power, and we can not consider this range outside of regional governments and monarchies in the country.

It is also important to note that the same spectrum was either part of the rulers themselves, or at least affiliated with local governments, otherwise they provided military support and at the same time had influence and share in the central power system. . After that, in the seventh layer of local readers, Kadkhodas and… were placed, and after that, the nation or subjects became widespread. The important point is that the king and his power cannot be understood without understanding any of these layers.

What class did the Mostofis belong to?

The group was in the Diwani class, the fourth layer of power, which also included ministers, secretaries, and Mustafa. Mostofis and secretaries were active at various levels, both at the level of rulers and governments and at the level of the court and monarchy.

If we study these layers carefully, we will find that the power structure is essentially a military-sectarian monarchy, which, of course, many historians may not agree with. But I emphasize that it is the sectarian monarchy, because the part of the military power of the government that was in the hands of these layers until the end of Qajar and the king took his power from them, were tribes, clans and nomads.

The tools of the Qajar Shah's power were his cavalry and infantry, which were provided by the same tribes, clans and nomads, and this process continued until the end of the Qajar period, and the country did not get rid of it. However, in some different periods of the Qajar period, changes were made in this system and even over time, the trained army with modern standards operated in parallel with this traditional military power and tried to teach them new military techniques and provided them with new weapons. . However, military power and main influence remained in the hands of the tribes and nomads. Each state ruler also had a military power of its own. The monarchy also relied and worked on the same military power and was almost under their influence. For this reason, our political structure was a combination of a tribal monarchy structure with a traditional military and urban court. Therefore, it is natural that the structure of our production is based on tradition.

Was there a limiting system for state power?

No, no arrangements or arrangements had been made by the center for this, and the political problems of the Qajar period were due to this point. Only the king could use his "full authority" to limit state and local rulers. The king could, if he wished, remove or advance these rulers by order. The king played with these rulers like chess pieces. So there was no political philosophy in this structure to control the situation. The traditional system of politics in this period was a kind of game with power in politics, and as I said, Amin al-Sultan's book referred to it, in fact, based on a kind of "bondage in politics" or "politics-play" between men on one side of the game and the king on the other. Was.

This game exists in all periods of the monarchy in Iran until the end of the Qajar period. We did not have a political theorist who knew the politics of the world and the politics of the country and the tools of power. We did not have experienced politicians like William Lamb and Vincent Melbourne, who was the British Foreign Secretary for many years. The system of games, fights and و was common in Iran.

Well, as I said, the structure of the economy and production is not outside the political structure. When this was the political structure, it is natural that the structure of the economy, especially in the production sector, would be in disarray. Production system in Iran based on agriculture and land ownership based on traditional irrigation or rainfed system. The owner gets a share and part of the crop goes to the farmer who worked on the land. Sometimes the farmer provided the seed and took the money from the crop, and sometimes the owner provided the seed.

What was the water distribution system like and who chose the supervisors of the water distribution system?

We had a water system for agricultural products through irrigation based on natural and rainfall rainfall or irrigation based on the share of groundwater and aqueducts. The division of water was sometimes based on certain old methods or, if not, based on the agreements of those who wanted a share of water from those who had sufficient power and financial ability to build wells and aqueducts. The amount and method of harvesting was agreed upon and was based on time. The central government did not play a direct role in these divisions, and the local governors were in charge of dividing the water, and they set the taxes on that basis. However, the rulers were obliged to pay taxes to the king.

The question may arise for you on what basis were the rulers elected? In fact, state governors, like today's governors, were elected to carry out government instructions. The land system was also based on sum, thiol, endowment and property. Sometimes these plots were leased or cultivated for everyone to enjoy. At the same time, each state had its own tradition and custom of producing the product. We were not subject to a particular system in agriculture. I believe a traditional structure still worked in this area. There have been occasional revisions to the structure. For example, in the north of the country, at some point, they started to grow and produce silk.

What were the studies of silk production in the north of the country and who popularized this production?

Silk production has almost long roots, but during the Qajar period Russia gained great power and influence in the northern states of Iran. Some Russian citizens came to Iran and after buying land, they started cultivating silk and expanding this industry. Silk was probably cultivated before, but its development as a strategic commodity may have increased during this period, because silk was one of the commodities used in industry.

During the Safavid period, however, Iran's silk trade flourished and was exported, and by the way, it was also in the hands of the government?

After Safavid period, this production decreased over time. I do not want to get into the discussion of the Safavid period, but in the distance between Safavid and Qajar, symmetrical governments came to power in Shiraz, Khorasan and parts of the country. Until the Qajar period, the agricultural situation was affected by disorder. During the Qajar period, Agham Mohammad Khan united the Turkish tribes and established a unified monarchy, and this unity of the country is politically important.

After him, Fath Ali Shah thinks that with this cavalry he can fight with a world power. This shows that he did not have a complete understanding of the state of the world at this time. What was the vision of Fath Ali Shah and Abbas Mirza as the first personalities of the country at that time? This is very important. You study the actions of Russian and British politicians during this period. See what chancellors were by their side or what insights they had into military structure, politics, production and trade. Fath Ali Shah entered a difficult game in the field of power and international politics in which he did not have a high hand. He entered an unbalanced war in the absence of a strong military structure.

After the Treaty of Golestan, Fath Ali Shah held an advisory council to wage a second war with Russia. In that parliament, everyone was talking about the need for war with Russia, but the deputy said something economically astonishing. He asks about the taxes of Iran and Russia. They say that the Iranian tax is six crores per year and the Russian tax is six hundred crores per year, and the deputy responds by saying that the war is not between six and six hundred rational. The same tax rate indicates low and weak production in Iran.

What matters is what taxes the Russians pay and what do we pay? The government closed the tax period on the empty shoulders of the Iranian people. A nation that was poor and its agriculture had deteriorated due to the struggles of symmetrical governments in pre-Qajar Iran and was struggling with a huge crisis in this area. In those battles, the irrigation and production systems were also partially destroyed.

In the Safavid period, we had a court that also traded. This situation is different from the later periods after Iran was involved in insecurity and unbalanced political and local changes. The country did not have enough integration in all sectors, and we started in the war phase when our economy was not yet well integrated.

Although Fath Ali Shah became a courtier and his way of thinking differed from that of Agham Mohammad Khan and he was able to solve problems, he engaged himself and the nation in a never-ending war that should not have happened. Perhaps if Fathlishah had given himself the opportunity not to enter into a conflict of unequal power, the next court after him could have done better, but this did not happen and he entered a war that did not have a winner in the system and politics, and this shows that He did not know enough about his own situation, his country, or the world. this is important. What does war mean when we have not achieved sufficient economic stability and our agriculture still survives and produces for the country, but has not yet been able to achieve a comparable ratio in markets outside Iran and produce wealth? As a rule, such a product, which was just coming to life, could not be taxed, and it is foolish to fight with an empty treasury.

If you agree, let's talk more about reviving the silk industry. You mentioned that the Russians revived this industry. What happened next and what effect did it have on the Iranian economy at that time?

Yes, the Russians revived the industry and were successful in production. In the book "Economic History of Iran: Qajar Era 1332 1215 AH" written by Charles Issavi translated by Yaqub Azhand, we can get a lot of information from various consulates in Iran. They have narrated Iran's trade statistics well. I am also translating his book Abbott Console. He gives detailed reports on the economic situation in Iran, what products each state has and what is its situation? His information is very accurate and we know our country through these reports. How many rulers in Iran do you know who have reported on the state of the country, economically or otherwise? How many diaries do you know of such reports?

Maybe, for example, Abdul Hussein Mirza Farmanfarma ....

No, even he has not given such reports and we have not had any rulers who, like foreign consuls, have written accurate and detailed reports on the state of the country. You will be amazed if you read the reports of British cryptographers Saeedi Sirjani or the Abbott Consul from different regions. Charles Christian uses these reports, and it is with these reports that we realize that the structure of production and trade is working and surviving at this time, although it does not meet our expectations. This survival of production and trade is also reflected in the reports of Schindler, Abbott and Lyazanov.

You said that Iranian-made silk was used in industry. Were these applications performed in Russia? You mean we exported raw silk?

No. We exported silk in the form of fibers and part of the production was processed in Iran, because raw silk was very difficult to transport. One of our main problems in the production and trade sector was the ways of Iran. The country did not have trade and industrial routes during the Qajar period, the transportation of goods was difficult, we did not have railways and shipping, which caused trade to lose its momentum, although the same eroding process of production and trade until the end of Qajar credit And maintained its status.

For trade and export, we had to take goods to major trade routes, borders or ports so that foreign buyers could transport them to their home countries. Transportation costs were very expensive for Iranian producers. For this reason, Iranian goods could not be properly reflected in world markets. Both in terms of production, which was poor, and in terms of the price that transportation was breaking.

Is it true that foreign traders, after buying from Iran, conditioned the delivery of goods to the border?

It is not possible to speak emphatically about this and it often seems so, however the transmission system was basically with merchants. Iranian merchants also acted as intermediaries. Our system was a mixture of business and brokerage. It is a mistake to think that in Iran, during the Qajar period, you could open a chapter entitled "Trade" similar to foreign and Western-style terms.

Merchants often had intermediaries for such work. The sale of the product was not done by the peasants, and there were transactions between governments and traders and merchants. Even today, you do not see a manufacturer selling its goods directly. In the same modern system today, intermediaries and brokers are engaged in this work and they make the most profit.

Basically, the power of intermediaries in Iran, which is also confirmed by Charles Christian, dates back to the Qajar period. That is, the brokerage culture was formed from that time. So, the history of brokerage dates back to the Qajar period. Of course, it may have existed before, but the surviving documents emphasize the Qajar period. In the past, the peasants were an important class who owned land and played a role in production and supplied goods without hoarding.

Hoarding reports are more for the Qajar period. For example, the Safavid period was not like this. When the Afghans invaded Iran and Isfahan was besieged, Shah Sultan Hussein - who is a hated figure to us - his first job was to provide all the food reserves of the royal warehouse to the people for free. What he did not do in the same situation as Ahmad Shah Qajar, for example.

In order to be able to store the goods, you need a correct and modern way of thinking, and this stock must be expert. Silk cannot be stored like wheat. In order to store the goods at that time, a suitable space had to be created so that the goods would not be damaged. Also, the transfer of goods wasted a lot of time due to the lack of unsuitable and difficult roads to reach the borders, which was just the beginning of its entry into the world markets, and all this was difficult to do. I mentioned that during the Qajar period, we did not have any means of transportation, so the goods were either destroyed or reached their destination with a lot of damage. Charles Issavi noted in his reports that many Iranian silk and even cotton products were destroyed along the way.

Production and trade require a political structure that is coordinating and overlapping. Our political and economic structures could not have such purposeful planning. Our structural system was tax-free. Our political system was only concerned with determining the consequences. He was thinking of filling the treasury. Wasn't there a system that wanted to pursue long-term planning, for example to say that this should be the gross domestic product for the next ten years? I have to provide this amount of warehouse and silo and ...

Do you study all the commercial cities of Iran in the Qajar period and see how many warehouses they had to store goods? These studies should be done to discuss economics.

Since the Abbas Mirza wars, Iranians have come to the conclusion that the structure needs to be changed, and this change of perspective has been fueled by the Russian military, which has been the subject of much debate. After that, many Iranians opened their feet to Europe. What effect did this worldview have on changing structures?

Undoubtedly, he gave perspective to some of the men of Iran. But I want to open a more important topic. The population of Iran from the Nasserite period to the end of the Qajar is estimated at between five and ten million. In the meantime, what percentage of us are literate?

When you read the statistics of all those who went abroad to study with the educated people of the Academy of Arts, you will reach something like three to four thousand educated people in a few decades. Were the educated experts? The training process had a major weakness. The fields of study were incoherent and did not overlap. Everyone reads whatever they want, especially to get a job and a position in the future; One studied lock and key engineering, another a painter, a cavalry engineering student, and another left medicine half-finished. None of these disciplines helped each other and did not overlap. To raise a generation in different disciplines that are diverse and unrelated.

For example, in the time of Abbas Mirza, the total number of people who travel to study is twelve. During the reign of Mohammad Shah, between sixty and one hundred people went to study, whether through the government or the private sector. It was built in 1268 AH, during the Nasserite period, and until the end of the reign of this king, between one hundred and one hundred and fifty students were educated annually in various fields from language, literature and system to chemistry. Of course, this is not a bad record and I do not want to paint a disappointing picture. Maybe for that time, a scientific institution that had this amount of output annually was good, but when you multiply the length of fifty years of Nasiri by one hundred and fifty, you get a small figure. If you extend this percentage to the whole country, then you will find that each state did not have five or six students.

This is also a very important point. For example, Mirza Shimi, who is the brother of Mirza Ibrahim Khan Mahallati (known as Mirza Cherti), wrote a treatise on photography and the emergence of photography and its medicines. But it was not clear how those drugs should be produced. His treatise is available in the Library of Parliament and has not been edited or published yet. What if this could give the next generation a serious insight into the issue you raised?

Now about photography, because Nasser al-Din Shah himself was a photographer, a pool for these drugs was arranged in the palace. But in general, educational programs were not purposeful and in line with the development of Iran. If the UK business is advanced, it's because of years of planned work behind them. They had prime ministers like Melbourne and professional economists, each of whom was today a major theorist in business, politics, and the military. We were in the absence of these men.

What effect did the presence of arrogant powers in Iran in those days have on our backwardness?

You see, we should not expect a power like Britain or any other power in the world to set its own goals in the politics and economy of the land and, for example, find itself thinking about the oppressed of Iran or its backwardness. Politics in the whole world does not have such a task. The structure of politics in any country is its duty to protect the national interests of that country. Melbourne once said that the duty of the British government is only to protect the interests of the British government. This is the headline of all British politicians, including the world, and they have no duty to Iranians and the world. Although it seems ethical for politicians in different countries to think about the oppressed in other countries, it is not part of their political thought policy and goals.

Of course, the Iranians themselves had an exploitative policy for their compatriots. The best example of this is the report that Edward Brown gives in his book "A Year Among the Iranians" about the weaving workshops in Kerman. But let's skip this. My other question is that at that time, Amin al-Zarb, as the most prominent businessman in Iran, was a major exporter of opium. At the same time, the East India Company controlled India's opium exports. However, Britain is one of the main customers of Iranian opium. The profitability of the business prompted Amin al-Zarb to invest in production. But after Amin al-Zarb, this profitable trade weakened, and during the reign of Reza Shah, it was very limited. What were the production problems of this product?

Iran was producing one of the best opium in the world at that time. For this reason, although Britain controlled the production and trade of Indian opium, it was still a customer of Iranian opium. A major problem for Iranian opium production was its transportation. Opium, in addition to being opium, was used in the European pharmaceutical industry, and they had to consider its quality. Later, in the opium produced in Iran, the Iranians themselves cheated and added other substances to it. This fraud helped weaken Iran's opium brand, and the government did not support production.

The government gave production to others and claimed only its responsibility to collect taxes. It did not take steps to build transportation routes, nor did it help improve security. The government was just a consumer of money and had no specific plans to solve the problems of the producer. Lack of security for trade routes was one of the most important problems that the government did not take steps to correct.

Until the end of World War I, opium-producing areas in Iran were not secure and the market was under pressure from insecurity. I think it is important what governments could do to remove barriers to production. The government must be both an observer and a controller, both a director and a policy-maker. But did our government do that? No. Farmers and landowners were left to fend for themselves, and problems caused a rift between them and the spectrum. Thus, production and trade in Iran continued until the Mossadegh period, when oil became more powerful. Production and trade of agricultural and non-oil products continued even with great fluctuations. Although agricultural production has been declining for years due to drought and continued for some years, unfortunately we have almost never had a well-planned program.

We had some important agricultural products that were used in industry. Tobacco, opium, cotton and silk. These were our strategic items. Of course, we also had production in other sectors, for example, northern rice was one of our important exports. Despite our miserable situation, the economy and production operated and continued in its traditional structure. We even produced three models of tobacco that were processed in Iran itself. Incidentally, the best type of tobacco was produced in Iran, especially for hookah. In his book Iran and the Case of Iran, Lord Curzon reports that Iranian hookahs are unique and unparalleled anywhere else in the Middle East.

The visible perspective we have on the poor people of Iran during the Qajar period does not reflect any reflection in the field of agricultural production. It was because of this continuity of production that Nasser al-Din Shah could rule for up to fifty years. Because in any case, he collected his taxes from the peasants who were engaged in agriculture. It can be said that the people themselves did not benefit from their products, but the imperial system benefited from that great bureaucratic system and collected taxes without any concessions. Expectations were high from the Iranian manufacturing sector, without any support.

That is, the government did not make an effort to remove the barriers?

Yes. They had no plans for high returns. Perhaps if, for example, they improved the ways in which goods could reach their consumer markets quickly, a step would be taken in the flourishing of the economy. These small things were not done by the Qajar rulers. The political structure of the country was asleep to advance and function the structure of the economy.

I would like to ask a question about the influence of three personalities on the Iranian economy: Amir Kabir, Amin al-Zarb and Seyed Jamaluddin Vaez Esfahani. How do you evaluate the performance of these three people?

You see, you should never put a weight like Amir Kabir next to Amin al-Zarb. Amir Kabir could see and understand the situation in the power structure. He understood the current situation and ordered that the courtiers be cut off because the money needed to be injected into the economy. But he could not completely stop the courtiers, and for this reason they were able to remove him. In other words, he had put pressure on the third layer of power. But Amin al-Zarb and Seyed Jamal Waez are just people. People who could do things and have ideas within the system. However, I do not believe in a person like Seyed Jamal Vaez as an economic theorist.

But Amin al-Zarb was also concerned with production. In letters to his brother who is in Europe, he orders to buy a water pump and a tractor and؟?

He had to, because he himself was a landowner and knew the difficult state of production as part of the production system. Even someone like Farmanfarma, in addition to ruling, was a landowner and was part of the production system. What happened to Amin al-Zarb was that he was placed in the system as a coin minting agent, which gave him a vision that was different from his previous visions. He was able to pay attention to his political and economic views on his own situation, and for this reason he became prominent.

Regarding Seyed Jamal Vaez, his concerns about the production and consumption of domestic goods are also important to me. In "The Dress of Piety", he raises interesting and up-to-date discussions that can somehow be placed in the field of political economy studies.

It can be said that these are all stories. Seyed Jamal is a preacher and his most important work is preaching. He is someone who traveled between merchants. He established the Islamic Company with several businessmen. He was also in the progressive class of constitutionalists. He was the one who had to communicate with people because it was part of his job. So he conveyed these insights to the people when he heard and understood them.

What Seyyed Jamal the preacher did was fundamentally different from what Amin al-Zarb did. Amin al-Zarb was placed in the political and economic structure and recognized the component of power and became somewhat familiar with economics. Seyyed Jamal, however, is the narrator and transmitter of the words of others. He was placed in a bed of progressive discourse. He interacted with the King of Theologians and Yahya Dolatabadi and understood their discourse. In "Pious Clothes", he conveys the ideas received from merchants. I even believe that he is reflecting on these reducing ideas, because he should have made them understandable to the people and the common people of that day. I do not want to say that he is not a great person, but he is just someone who explains and explains the messages to the society in a simple way. He travels to Shiraz, for example, and gives lectures, and his texts are published in the Adab newspaper.

But its effectiveness is important. Was he able to lead people to consume domestic goods?

That was his job. The preacher's job is to tell people what he wants them to understand, but that is not necessarily all he has to say. It does not seem that in "Taqwa al-Taqwa" all ideas were originally from Seyyed Jamal Waez himself. These concerns reflected in his treatise are the thoughts of all the patriots of the time, and the "dress of piety" provides a platform for its reflection. With these sentences, I just want to express the position of Seyed Jamal Vaez to you. He has no insight into political and economic structures. We need to focus on other topics today. Identify the links between structures and measure the slowing factors that provide expert work, and new insights from the humanities will empower us.

For the intellectuals of the Qajar period, the utopia was a country full of factories with domestic products, but they were unable to achieve a proper understanding of the current situation, the factors affecting society, and so on. They failed to create a proper economic discourse on production and the economy. Therefore, we should not reduce the economic analysis of that period to the discussions of the intellectual circles of that period. They had ideals, and they ran after those ideals and sacrificed their lives for them, but they did not find a way to improve and dissect it, and the problems of solving remained unresolved due to the lack of economic theory. The economic contexts of the time were not known and the events related to this issue were not evaluated. As a result, many issues remained unclear.

Perhaps the main problem was that we did not have an economic theorist who knew the country's economy well, and perhaps we did not want to have one. None of the early students sent to Europe studied economics and its sub-fields.

From the establishment of the Academy of Arts and the beginning of the translation movement during the Qajar period, until the publication of the book "Principles of the Science of Wealth of Nations" by Zaka-ol-Molk Foroughi, we did not have any theoretical text about economics.

You read how many of our economists are from Qajar to the present day? If we understand their scarcity, then we can talk about the problems of the Iranian economy and the lack of economic structure and the problems that have continued to this day. Read and see how many books in the field of economics have been written or translated in this field and how many of the main sources of economics in the world have been translated into Persian?

We are faced with a weak intellectual foundation. Of course, there were those who did a good job and raised structural issues, but for political reasons they were not given the opportunity to work. It is not possible to gain economic insight and build a utopia with texts such as "Pious Clothes". Seyyed Jamal Vaez did not know economic structures and was not aware of economics. His job was just to preach and excite the people.